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RACIAL QUOTAS AND THE JURY
BY ALBERT W. ALSCHULER*
I. Some History
Few statements are more likely to evoke disturb-
ing images of American criminal justice than this
one: "The defendant was tried by an all-white jury."
This statement might bring to mind the
Scottsboro boys-uneducated African-American
youths riding on a freight train through Jackson
County, Alabama, in 1931; victors in a fight with
white youths on the train; charged after their arrests
with raping two white women; rushed to judgment
before all-white juries; and sentenced to death.' The
state's denial of effective counsel to these defendants
led to the Supreme Court's decision in Powell v.
Alabama,' in which the Court held for the first time
that the Constitution affords a right to counsel in
state capital proceedings. Following the ruling in
Powell, following another Supreme Court decision
three years later condemning racial discrimination
in the selection of a Scottsboro defendant's jury on
retrial,3 and following a supposed rape victim's repu-
diation of her charges, further retrials before all-
white juries produced new convictions. Pleas from
Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt for gubernatorial
pardons proved unavailing. The last of the
* Wilson-Dickinson Professor, the University of Chicago Law School.
I gratefully acknowledge the research support of the Leonard
Sorkin Faculty Fund and the Sonnenschein Fund, the outstanding
research assistance of Scott Yut, and the helpful comments of Vikram
David Amar, Penelope Bryan, Linda Chavez, Elena Kagan, Dan
Kahan, Randall Kennedy, Nancy King, A.J. Kramer, Michael
McConnell, Tracey Meares, Deborah Ramirez, Jeffrey Rosen, Stephen
Schulhofer, and Richard Uviller.
1 The case of the youngest of the nine defendants, a 13-year-old,
ended in a mistrial. Some jurors voted to accept the prosecutor's rec-
ommendation of a life sentence while others insisted upon the death
penalty.
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 596-99 (1935).
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Scottsboro defendants to be released from prison
was paroled in 1950. That same year, Alabama
sought the extradition of another who had escaped
to Michigan.'
One also might think of an earlier time than
Scottsboro and of the Ku Klux Klan's epidemic of
violence against African-Americans and white
Republicans in the years following the Civil War.
Senator John Sherman, a supporter of the Ku Klux
Act of 1871, recited a series of atrocities in the
South and noted that "from the beginning to the
end in all this extent of territory no man has ever
been convicted or punished for any of these offenses,
not one."' One of several southern judges who
offered evidentiary support for Sherman's allegations
declared, "In nine cases out of ten the men who
commit the crimes constitute or sit on the grand
jury, either they themselves or their near relatives or
friends, sympathizers, aiders, or abettors . . . ."6
Sherman later supported the 1875 federal statute
that outlawed racial discrimination in state jury
selection.' Like other Republican leaders, he recog-
nized that all-white juries would serve as instruments
of oppression not only when African-American liti-
gants came before them but also when white jurors
closed their eyes to the use of terror and violence to
enforce America's racial caste system. As an
African-American commentator said in 1912, the
problem is "not so much that the negro fails to get
justice before the courts" as that "too often . .. the . .
. white man ... escapes it."' Gunnar Myrdal's land-
mark 1944 study of race in America declared, "It is
notorious that practically never have white lynching
See Dan T. Carter, Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American South
412-13 (1969); James E. Goodman, Stories of Scottsboro 380-81 (1994).
Although the Scottsboro defendants escaped execution, the link
between all-white juries and racial disparity in the imposition of capi-
tal punishment in the South has been incontestable. Between 1930
and 1977, of the 62 men whom Georgia executed for rape, all but four
were African-Americans. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 332
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Petitioner at 56,
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 75-5444)).
5 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 157-58 (1871).
6 Id. (quoting Judge Russel).
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 335,
336-37 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1988)).
Edward L. Ayers, Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in
the Nineteenth-Century American South 179 (1984) (quoting William
H. Thomas, The Negro and Crime, Speech at the Southern
Sociological Congress, Nashville (May 1912)).
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mobs been brought to court in the South, even
when the killers are known to all in the community
and are mentioned by name in the local press."9
One's thoughts might turn to a time more recent
than Scottsboro-the summer of 1955, when in
Money, Mississippi, Emmett Till, a fourteen-year-old
African-American visitor from Chicago, accepted a
dare to speak to a white woman.'" "Bye, Baby," he
said. Several days later, Till's mangled body was dis-
covered in the Tallahatchie River. Roy Bryant, the
husband of the white woman, and J.W. Milam, the
woman's brother, were charged with Till's murder.
The principal evidence against them was the testi-
mony of an African-American, Mose Wright. An
all-white jury took slightly more than an hour to
acquit the defendants. One juror explained, "If we
hadn't stopped to drink pop, it wouldn't have taken
that long."" Following the defendants' acquittal,
they sold their story to a journalist for $4,000.
Bryant and Milam said that they had meant merely
to frighten Till but "had" to kill him when he
refused to beg for mercy. 2 During the next decade,
as large-scale civil rights activity came to the South,
all-white juries failed to convict the defendants
accused of killing Medgar Evers, Viola Liuzzo, and
Lemuel Penn.'
Talk of all-white juries might.evoke a time still
closer to the present. In Miami in 1980, four white
police officers were tried on charges that they had
beaten to death an African-American arrested for a
traffic offense. The defendants' attorneys, acting
together, struck every potential African-American
juror, and the all-white jury that their challenges
produced acquitted the officers. The Miami riots fol-
lowed. Four years later, another Miami police officer
was charged with manslaughter in the death of an
African-American suspect. Again, the defense attor-
ney's strikes produced an all-white jury; again the
9 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Poblem and
Modern Democracy 552-53 (1944).
'oSe Juan Williams, Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years,
1954-1965, at 39-52 (1987).
11Stephen J. Whitfield, A Death in the Delta: The Story of Emmett
TiU 42 (1988).
12 Williams, supra note 10, at 42.
' For an indication of the strength of the evidence in one of these
cases, see Michal R. Belknap, The Legal Legacy of Lemuel Penn, 25
How. L. J. 467 (1982).
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defendant was acquitted; and again the acquittal
sparked public outcry.14
In thinking of race and juries, the events of
April 29, 1992, are likely to be close to mind. On
that date, a California jury with no African-
American members failed to convict any of four
Los Angeles police officers of misconduct despite
the fact that most of these officers had been video-
taped kicking and beating Rodney King, an
African-American suspect, as he lay on the ground.
The jury's decision triggered the worst race riot in
American history," two days of violence that cost
fifty-eight lives and nearly one billion dollars in
property damage.
Two conclusions about juries composed entirely
of members of America's majority race seem almost
too obvious to mention. First, in many communities,
these juries are mistrusted; and second, the mistrust
has deep historical roots."
II. The Hennepin County Quotas
A year before the 1992 Los Angeles riots, an all-
white grand jury in Minneapolis, Minnesota, exon-
erated Dan May, a white police officer who had shot
and killed Tycel Nelson, a seventeen-year-old
African-American suspect.'" The grand jury's no-bill
of Officer May and the protests and tension that fol-
lowed were among the circumstances that prompted
1
4 See William T. Pizzi, "Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease
but Killing the Patient," 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 97, 153-54.
1
5 William Julius Wilson, "Crisis and Challenge: Race and the
New Urban Poverty," U. Chi. Rec., Dec. 8, 1994, at 2, 4.
"See Seth Mydans, "Prosecutor Seeks Retrial of Officer in King
Beating," N.Y. Times, May 14, 1992, at A20; Neal R. Peirce, "Look
Homeward, City of Angels," 24 Nat'l1. 1250 (1992). Mayor Tom
Bradley of Los Angeles voiced the sentiment of many Americans
when he said of the videotape, "We saw what we saw. What we saw
was a crime." Bill Boyarsky, "Ashes of a Mayor's Dream," L.A. Times,
May 1, 1992, at B2. A federal court jury composed of nine whites, two
African-Americans, and one Latino later convicted two of the officers
involved in the beating of violating Rodney King's civil rights. See
Jim Newton, "Koon, Powell Get 2 1/2 Years in Prison," L.A. Times,
Aug. 5, 1993, at Al; Jim Newton, "Racially Mixed Jury Selected for
Kini Trial," L.A. Times, Feb. 23, 1993, at Al.
This mistrust in fact extends to some juries not composed
entirely of members of America's majority race. See infra note 117
and accompanying text.
'
5 Jill Hodges, "Officer Cleared in Shooting: Grand Jury Brings No
Charges in Death of Tycel Nelson," Minneapolis Star Trib., Mar. 27,
1991, at Al.
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a Hennepin County task force to recommend," and
the Minnesota Supreme Court to approve,20 a plan
for abolishing all-white grand juries in Hennepin
County. Governments can reduce the likelihood of
all-white juries in many ways," but there is only one
way to end them. The Hennepin County Task Force
proposed racial quotas.22 Because the use of quotas in
selecting petit jurors would not pose significantly
different constitutional issues from those raised by
their use to select grand jurors, the Hennepin
County proposal offers a useful vehicle for assessing
the issues raised by affirmative action in the selec-
tion of both grand and petit jurors.23
Most felony prosecutions in Hennepin County
are commenced by information rather than by grand
9 Hennepin County Attorney's Task Force on Racial Composition of
the Grand jury, Final Report 45 (1992) [hereinafter Hennepin County
Final Report].
20See Maureen M. Smith, "Pilot Plan to Assure That Each Grand
Jury Has Two Minorities," Minneapolis Star Trib., Oct. 29, 1993, at B6.
2 For example, governments can use more inclusive jury source
lists, eliminate or restrict peremptory challenges, increase jury size,
reconfigure the geographic vicinages from which jurors are drawn,
take steps to encourage or enforce compliance with jury summonses,
make jury service more convenient or remunerative, require judges to
take racial demography into account when ordering a change of
venue, or "oversample" minorities in sending jury summonses and
questionnaires. See Nancy J. King, "Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or
Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury
Selection," 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 707, 752-56, 771-72 (1993).22 Hennepin County Final Report, supra note 19, at 45. The Task
Force proposal remains unimplemented. Officials are following poten-
tially relevant constitutional litigation in Georgia, seeking a formal
amendment of the Minnesota Jury Management Rules, Minn. R.
628.41 (1992), and attempting to devise and to secure the approval of
procedures for testing the proposal's constitutionality.
23The use of quotas to select petit juries would have been a more
significant innovation in the criminal justice system. Grand juries no
longer initiate most felony prosecutions; unlike most petit juries, they
need not act by unanimous vote and typically may act by majority
vote; their function is to determine the existence of probable cause
rather than guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; they proceed without an
adversary presentation of evidence; and they often seem dominated by
the prosecutors who advise them. Marvin Frankel & Gary Naftalis,
The Grand jury: An Institution on Trial 16-24, 67-71 (1977).
Extension of the Hennepin County Task Force proposal to petit
juries would require judges to draw substitute jurors from a list of
minority persons whenever either peremptory challenges or challenges
for cause reduced the number of minority persons below the required
minimum. A lawyer's knowledge that a challenged minority juror
would be replaced by another would reduce the lawyer's incentive to
engage in racial discrimination in jury selection and would have some
bearing on whether the lawyer had engaged in discrimination in fact.
Implementation of the proposal would not otherwise affect a court's
administration of the requirements of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), and Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
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jury indictment, but all first-degree murder cases
must be submitted to a grand jury. 4 Although only
9% of the adults in Hennepin County are people of
color, a majority of the homicide cases presented to
the grand jury involve people of color as victims,
suspects, or both. Specifically, in cases presented to
Hennepin County grand juries since the end of
1989, 66% of all victims and 71% of all suspects
have been members of racial or ethnic minorities."
The methods used to select grand jurors in
Hennepin County are almost certainly constitution-
al, yet the proportion of minorities on Hennepin
County grand juries in recent years has been 5.3%,
substantially smaller than the proportion of racial
minorities in the adult population.2 6 Moreover, the
county's grand jury selection methods yield all-white
grand juries nearly 40% of the time.2 7 A striking fact,
then, is that although 71% of the suspects whose
cases come before Hennepin County grand juries are
people of color, 40% of these suspects' cases are
heard by bodies of twenty-three people that include
no minority-group members.
Under the Task Force proposal, a questionnaire
would ask prospective grand jurors whether they
wished to identify themselves as "minority per-
sons."2 ' No one would probe the prospective jurors'
responses or scrutinize their ancestry. Twenty-one of
the grand jury's twenty-three members29 would then
24Minn. R. Crim. P. 8.01.
2 5 Hennepin County Final Report, supra nob 19, at 29.
261d. at 27. Hennepin County selects its jurors from driver's
license, state identification card, and voter registration lists. These
lists apparently include more than 98% of the eligible adult popula-
tion. Id. at 9, 38. Minority-group members, however, change their
places of residence more frequently than whites. King, supra note 21,
at 714. The lists from which jurors are selected include people who
have recently left Hennepin County, omit people who have recently
come into the county, and provide incorrect addresses for some people
who have recently changed residences within the county. See
Hennepin County Final Report, supra note 19, at 38 (suggesting updat-
ing voter registration lists every two years instead of every four years).
Minority-group members not only are less likely than whites to
receive jury summonses and questionnaires but also are less likely to
retrirm them. See King, supra note 21, at 714. The members of minori-
ty groups also may be more likely than whites to be excused from jury
service on grounds of financial hardship, responsibility for the care of
another, and the like.
2 Specifically, 26 of 66 grand juries since 1968. Hennepin County
Final Report, supra note 19, at 27.
28 See id. at 45.
29 Minnesota, like most other states and the federal govern-
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be selected at random from a list of fifty-five people
qualified to serve.30 If the questionnaires of at least
two of these twenty-one jurors revealed that they
were "minority persons," the remaining grand jurors
would be selected in the same way that the first
twenty-one had been. If, however, no minority per-
sons or only one were included in the initial group,
officials would draw one or two grand jurors exclu-
sively from respondents who had identified them-
selves as minority persons. If necessary, the officials
could turn to a second list of fifty-five people or a
third or a fourth to ensure the presence of at least
two minority persons on every Hennepin County
grand jury.' Apart from these officials, no one would
know whether a grand jury had been selected at ran-
dom or partly through jurymandering.32
III. Other Quotas
The Hennepin County proposal is one of a num-
ber of affirmative-action jury-selection measures cur-
rently under consideration or already in place in
American jurisdictions. In Arizona, a bar committee
has proposed dividing jury lists into subsets by race
and drawing jurors from each subset." Some Arizona
judges currently strike trial juries that, in their view,
do not include adequate numbers of minority
jurors." In DeKalb County, Georgia, jury commis-
sioners divide jury lists into thirty-six demographic
groups (for example, black females aged 35 to 44);
ment, authorizes smaller grand juries, see Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.03;
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 628.41(1) (1993), but Hennepin County adheres
to the number 23-the number of grand jurors that English law
required from the 14th century until England abolished use of the
grand jury in 1933. See Jon Van Dyke, "The Grand jury:
Representative or Elite?," 28 Hastings L.J. 37, 38-41 (1976).
30Hennepin County Final Report, supra note 19, at 45.
3 1 Id.
32The term "jurymandering" is Jeff Rosen's. See Jeff Rosen,
"Jur mandering," New Republic, Nov. 30, 1992, at 15.
3 Jeff Barge, "Reformers Target Jury Lists," A.B.A. ]., Jan. 1995,
at 26, 26.
3 Id. (noting that in order to include some Hispanic-Americans
on an African-American defendant's jury, Judge B. Michael Dann
once impaneled three successive juries). R. William Ide, then presi-
dent of the American Bar Association, described in an ABA Journal
column the proposals of an ABA task force to reduce racial and ethnic
bias in the justice system. These proposals included "[cihanging jury
selection practices to ensure proportionate minority representation."
R. William Ide III, "Eradicating Bias in the Justice System," A.B.A. ].,
Mar. 1994, at 8.
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they then use a computer to ensure the proportional
representation of every group on every venire.
The Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of
19686 was designed to ensure a measure of racial bal-
ance in federal jury panels. The Act requires panels
to be drawn from voter registration rolls or from lists
of actual voters unless the use of these sources would
lead to the substantial underrepresentation of a racial
(or other) group. In that event, the Act orders courts
to augment the voting rolls with other sources."
For ten years, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan maintained a racially bal-
anced jury wheel by sending extra jury questionnaires
to areas in which African-Americans constituted 65%
or more of the population. More recently, this court
has sought demographic balance by removing from the
jury wheel some questionnaires of whites."
Similar color-conscious jury selection methods
are in use in other jurisdictions to "balance the
box"-that is, to ensure racial proportionality in the
initial pool from which petit and grand juries are
drawn." Seeking racial balance in the wheels and
boxes from which petit and grand jurors are drawn
appears to be less controversial than seeking racial
balance in juries themselves." The reason for creat-
ing racially balanced jury pools, however, is presum-
ably to make racially balanced juries more likely.
Although departures from the principle of color-
blindness may be less visible when they occur early
in the jury selection process, they do not seem signif-
icantly different in principle.
To be sure, the demographics of particular juris-
dictions may make it easier to achieve racial balance
in large groups than in small groups. For example,
3 5 Andrew Kull, "Racial Justice," New Republic, Nov. 30, 1992, at
17, 18.
A Florida statute requires that, upon a motion of any party, every
judge who orders a change of venue "give priority to any county
which closely resembles the demographic composition of the county
wherein the original venue would lie." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 910.03(2)
(West Supp. 1995).
3
1Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1861-1878 (1988)).
3 7 See id. § 1863(b)(2); Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805 app. at 815-
19 (5th Cir. 1975) (study by Judge Walter P. Gewin, An Analysis of
Jury Selection Decisions).
3 5See King, supra note 21, at 722-23.
39Randall Kennedy, "The Racial Rigging of Juries," Am.
Experiment, Fall 1994, at 1; see King, supra note 21, at 719-26.
4See King, supra note 21, at 726.
8
DeKalb County, Georgia, plainly could not include
representatives of thirty-six demographic categories
on a jury of only twelve people. After attaining a
balance in a jury pool that would be unattainable in
a jury, officials might reasonably leave to chance the
extent to which particular groups were represented
on juries.4' In the absence of demographic con-
straints, however, the use of quotas to select juries
seems no more objectionable than the use of quotas
to select jury pools. If, for example, a county's popu-
lation were two-thirds white and one-third black,
providing that only the initial pool need reflect this
balance would seem a hesitant and ineffective way of
making juries more representative. Exorcising the
specter of the all-white jury altogether would appear
more sensible. Nevertheless, for some observers, the
use of quotas in jury selection apparently becomes
less troublesome when there remains a sporting
chance that these quotas will not achieve their
objective." These observers may share to some
degree the posture of some opponents of affirmative
action in jury selection-hoping for racial balance
on juries, at least in some cases, but unwilling to act
directly to bring it about. Somewhat like champions
of the ordeal, these observers appear to trust the gods
of Fate, Luck, and Statistics."
IV. The Venerable Quota
The determination of jury membership by demo-
41 See infra Section VIII(B); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 86 n.6 (1986) ("[Ilt would be impossible to apply a concept of pro-
portional representation to the petit jury in view of the heterogenous
nature of our society.").
4 2 Color-conscious jury selection methods tend to be less visible at
the early stages of the process partly because they are less effective. A
jurisdiction like Hennepin County might send jury questionnaires to
minority-group members at a higher rate than to whites (because
minority-group members are less likely to receive and return them,
supra note 26), and this measure might produce a pool of prospective
jurors in which the proportion of minority jurors matched the propor-
tion of minority-group members in the county's adult population-
say, 10%. The random selection of 23 grand jurors from a large pool
engineered to ensure 10% minority-group membership would yield all-
white grand juries 9% of the time. Report by Steven D. Penrod to the
County Attorney's Office, Hennepin County, Minnesota (1994) (on
file with author).
4 3The phrase "Fate, Luck, and Statistics" is appropriated from
Andrew G. Deiss, "Negotiating Justice: The Criminal Jury Trial in a
Pluralist America" 23 (1995) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
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graphic quotas is not new. Before the end of the
twelfth century, English charters promised Jews that
disputes between Jews and English subjects would
be resolved by juries composed half of Jews and half
of Englishmen." These charters originated the
English jury de medietate linguae-a jury composed
half of Englishmen and half of the countrymen of
an alien party.45 The use of mixed juries in cases
involving aliens remained a feature of English law
for 700 years.46
Members of the Plymouth Colony employed a
similar procedure in 1674 when they added six
Indians to a jury of twelve colonists to try three
Indians for murder.4 1 In 1823-in one of several
recorded cases of early American jurymandering-
Chief Justice John Marshall impaneled a jury de
medietate linguae to try an alien charged with piracy
and murder."
4See Marianne Constable, The Law of the Other: The Mixed Jury
and Changing Conceptions of Citizenship, Law, and Knowledge 4-5, 18,
96-97, 145 (1994).
4 5 Following England's expulsion of the Jews in 1290, juries de
medietate linguae were used primarily in cases involving alien mer-
chants. See Lewis H. LaRue, "A Jury of One's Peers," 33 Wash. & Lee
L Rev. 841, 848-50 (1976); Deborah A. Ramirez, "The Mixed Jury and
the Ancient Custom of 'de Medietate Linguae': A History and a
Proposal for Change," 74 B.U. L. Rev. 777 (1994); Daniel W. Van
Ness, "Preserving a Community Voice: The Case for Half-and-Half
Juries in Racially-Charged Criminal Cases," 28 ]. Marshall L. Rev. 1,
35-37 (1994); see also Peter J. Nelligan & Harry V. Ball, "Ethnic
Juries in Hawaii: 1825-1850," 34 Soc. Process in Hawaii 113 (1992)
(describing the use of mixed juries to resolve disputes between natives
and foreigners in 19th-century Hawaii).
Ramirez, supra note 45.
4 7 Id.
4
8United States v. Cartacho, 25 F. Cas. 312, 312-13 (D. Va. 1823)
(No. 14,738).
The jury de medietate linguae may not seem closely analogous to
the procedures proposed by the Hennepin County Task Force. The
aliens who served on juries de nedietate linguae were ineligible to serve
on other juries, and the analogous treatment of the members of minor-
ity groups might disqualify them from serving on juries in cases involv-
ing white litigants while guaranteeing that they would constitute half
of all jurors in cases involving minority litigants. This procedure
would treat minority-race jurors, like the aliens who served on juries
de medietate linguae, as less than full members of the community. The
history of the jury de medietate linguae could be cited to support the
claim that demographic jurymandering is permissible, but this history
is consistent with the proposition that demographic distinctions
among citizens are rarely appropriate.
England, however, did use mixed juries in some cases in which all
of the parties were English. Burgesses sometimes obtained juries com-
posed half of burgesses; disputes concerning church patronage were
tried before juries composed half of clerics and half of laymen; and
university scholars were tried for serious crimes by juries composed
10
Apparently no African-Americans served on
juries in the United States before 1860.1' When
Reconstruction governments ended the exclusion of
African-Americans in the South, they sometimes
mandated racial quotas as well. The first African-
Americans selected for jury service in the South
were the six impaneled along with six whites to try
Jefferson Davis for treason. Although this racially
balanced jury was discharged when the government
elected not to prosecute,"o in at least a few southern
jurisdictions, judges and other officials ensured that
the earliest integrated juries were composed half of
blacks and half of whites."
In South Carolina, where the state legislature
required that grand and petit juries reflect the racial
composition of the counties in which they sat," an
observer declared in 1869, "The sensation is peculiar
. . . to see a Court in session, where former slaves sit
side by side with their old owners on the jury, where
white men are tried by a mixed jury, where colored
lawyers plead, and where white and colored officers
half of freeholders and half of matriculated laymen. James C. Oldham,
"The Origins of the Special Jury," 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 137, 168-69
(1983). Early in the 19th century, Jeremy Bentham recalled the
"genius of some now forgotten statesman" who had invented the jury
de medietate linguae and proposed the use of "half-and-half' juries com-
posed of six gentlemen and six yeomen. See Jeremy Bentham, The
Elements of the Art of Packing, As Applied to Special Juries, Particularly in
Cases of Libel Law 222-26 (Garland Publishing 1978) (1821); Van
Ness, supra note 45, at 32-35, 45.
49 The first African-Americans ever to serve on a jury in America
were apparently two who sat in Worcester, Massachusetts, that year.
Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790-
1860, at 94 (1961).
In 1718, however, the Attorney General of Maryland agreed that
"negro Jem," charged with murder, should be tried by a jury de medi-
etate linguae. William Kilty, Statutes Found Applicable 152 (1811) (cita-
tion supplied by Deborah Ramirez). It is uncertain whether Jem's race
triggered the decision to grant his request for a mixed jury and
whether his jury included African-Americans. My colleague Richard
Ross suggests that racial attitudes in Maryland in the early 18th centu-
ry make these possibilities unlikely and that "negro Jem" could well
have been a subject of the Netherlands, France, or Spain.
50See Jeffrey Abramson, We, The Jury: TheJury System and the Ideal
of Democracy 106 (1994) (citing "The First Integrated Jury Impaneled
in the United States," May 1867, 33 Negro Hist. Bull. 134 (1933)).
51 See Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution,
1863-1877, at 358 (1988); Douglas L. Colbert, "Challenging the
Challenge: ThIrteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the
Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges," 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 50
n.234 (1990).
52Joel Williamson, After Slavery: The Negro in South Carolina
During Reconstruction, 1861-1877, at 334 (1965).
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maintain order."" Statesmen of the generation that
wrote and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
apparently did not consider racially balanced juries
discriminatory." Nevertheless, when a black defen-
dant argued in 1879 that the Constitution required
his jury venire to be one-third black, the Supreme
Court unanimously rejected his contention."
Language in some of the Supreme Court's recent
opinions-notably City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 6 Shaw v. Renos," and Adarand Constructors v.
Pefia" -indicates that the Court would depart from
the probable "original intention" of Reconstruction
statesmen and would subject Hennepin County-style
affirmative action to strict scrutiny. Some academic
commentators have suggested that the Hennepin
County proposal is unconstitutional." I believe,
" Id. at 329-30 (citing N.Y. Times, June 14, 1869, at 5).
5
4See Eric Schnapper, "Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment," 71 Va. L Rev. 753, 754 (1985):
[R]ace concious Reconstruction programs were enacted con-
currently with the fourteenth amendment and were supported
by the same legislators who favored the constitutional guaran-
tee of equal protection. This history strongly suggests that the
framers of the amendment could not have intended it general-
ly to prohibit affirmative action for blacks or other disadvan-
taged groups.
5 5 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1879):
It is a right to which every colored man is entitled, that in the
selection of jurors to pass upon his life, liberty, or property,
there shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination
against them because of their color. But this is a different thing
from the right which it is asserted was denied to the petitioners
by the State court, viz. a right to have the jury composed in part
of colored men.
Cf. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 291 (1947) ("Even in the Negro
cases, this Court has never undertaken to say that a want of propor-
tionate representation of groups, which is not proved to be deliberate
and intentional, is sufficient to violate the Constitution.").
56 488 U.S. 469, 486-93 (1989).
" 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824-25, 2829 (1993).
51115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
5 9 See King, supra note 21, at 760-75 (approving of some color-
conscious jury selection methods but apparently disapproving of
Hennepin County-style quotas); Memorandum from Dan Farber to
Carl Warren (Oct. 8, 1991), in Hennepin County Final Report, supra
note 19, app. (doubting that the Hennepin County proposal could sat-
isfy the standards of Croson but "personally find[ing] the proposal
quite reasonable"); Letter from Fred L. Morrison to Louis N. Smith 3
(Oct. 8, 1991), in Hennepin County Final Report, supra note 19, app.
("lIlt would appear that the proposal would have to meet the 'strict
scrutiny' test. None of the rationales put forward seems to reach this
high level of necessity."). But see Letter from Shari Lynn Johnson to
Michael 0. Freeman 2 (Oct. 22, 1991), in Hennepin County Final
Report, supra note 19, app. ("The strict scrutiny standard can be
met."); Letter from Roy L. Brooks to Michael 0. Freeman 3 (Oct. 21,
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however, that a court attuned to the virtues of judi-
cial restraint and local initiative ought to uphold the
Hennepin County plan. In supporting this position,
my goal will be not to repeat familiar arguments
about affirmative action but to emphasize that affir-
mative action in the context of jury selection pre-
sents a different issue from any that the Supreme
Court has considered.
V. Juries Are Different
The Supreme Court has recognized that the
importance of representative juries justifies a depar-
ture from the standards employed in equal protec-
tion litigation to test assertedly discriminatory gov-
ernmental action. The Court has held that in crimi-
nal cases the systematic exclusion of an identifiable
group from jury venires violates a "fair cross-section
requirement" implicit in the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial. In 1940, the Court wrote, "It is
part of the established tradition in the use of juries as
instruments of public justice that the jury be a body
truly representative of the community,"o and in
1975 the Court declared, "[Tihe selection of a petit
jury from a representative cross section of the com-
munity is an essential component of the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial."' Although the fair
cross-section requirement does not truly require that
either juries or jury venires include a cross-section of
the population (a result that would require the use of
demographic quotas),62 the Court's test of discrimi-
1991), in Hennepin County Final Report, supra note 19, app. ("[Tihe
Task Force's proposal . . . should survive constitutional scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause.").
6Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
6 1 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. S22, 528 (1975).
6
2n Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538, the Court declared that the fair
cross-section requirement does not require "that petit juries actually
chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive
groups in the population." Disregarding the fair cross-section require-
ment's grounding in the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury
(and not to an impartial jury panel), the Court also has said that the
requirement extends only to the panels from which juries are selected,
not to the juries themselves. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174
(1986). Even in the selection of jury panels, the Court has condemned
only the "systematic" exclusion of distinctive groups. See id.; Duren v.
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). "Systematic" exclusion probably
does not encompass repeated "accidental" exclusion. See Albert W.
Alschuler, "The Supreme Court and the jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of jury Verdicts," 56 U. Chi. L Rev. 153,
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nation under the Sixth Amendment looks less to
purpose and more to effect than does the test of dis-
crimination that the Court employs in cases arising
under the Equal Protection Clause.3
Juries are distinctive both because affirmative
action in jury selection has special virtues and because
it is likely to prove less costly to individuals and soci-
ety than affirmative action in other contexts.
Emphasizing the distinctive virtues, Vikram David
Amar has noted the kinship between jury service and
voting. He contends that color-conscious jury selec-
tion can extend participation in public affairs more
widely and that race-conscious measures to promote
civic participation are easier to square with the
Constitution than other affirmative action measures.'
The distinctive lack of harm of race-conscious
jury selection methods becomes evident upon a
review of the ways in which racial classifications can
injure people. A person challenging an affirmative
action program typically has been denied a tangible
benefit-a job, a promotion, a government contract,
or admission to an educational program-largely on
the basis of race. Jury service is in one sense a job,
albeit a job that pays less than two dollars per hour,65
and some jurors find their courtroom experience
rewarding. Nevertheless, most prospective jurors
attempt to avoid service, 66 and because jurors are
185 n.127 (1989) ("[Wlere the luck of the draw to yield a jury, a jury
panel, or even five consecutive jury panels composed entirely of
wealthy Republican women golfers, their selection probably would not
violate the Constitution.").
"See Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n.26 (noting that in equal protec-
tion cases, statistical disparity is evidence of discriminatory purpose
that may be rebutted, but that "in Sixth Amendment fair-cross-sec-
tion cases, systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an infringe-
ment . . ."); Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure §
21.2(c)-(d), at 835-38 (student ed. 1985); see also Casteneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 510 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that the fair cross-section requirement invalidates some practices not
condemned by the Equal Protection Clause).
6See Vikram D. Amar, "Jury Service as Political Participation
Akin To Voting," 80 Cornell L. Rev. 203 (1995) (noting also a work-
in-progress by Amar and Alan Brownstein that will explore the issue in
greater detail). Cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)
("Community participation in the administration of the criminal law. . .
is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical
to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.").
6 5 See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 593.48 (West 1988) (authorizing the
payment of $15 per day to jurors).
"See Stephen J. Adler, The Jury: Trial and Error in the American
Courtroom 14 (1994). Most Americans who are sent jury summonses
never appear at the courthouse because their summonses are not
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selected mostly on the basis of chance, even
prospective jurors who would prefer to serve have
little personal expectation or claim to be chosen.
Who might have served on Hennepin County
grand juries in the absence of the county's efforts to
achieve racial balance can never be known. Anyone
on the list of qualified jurors might have been cho-
sen if selection had proceeded at random. Even if
some displaced majority-race juror could learn who
he was, however, he would be unlikely to conclude
that the county's racial classification had denied him
a significant tangible benefit.
Apart from any loss of tangible benefits, a racial
classification can injure by stigmatizing, demeaning,
or reinforcing group stereotypes. Again, however, a
white person displaced from a grand jury in order to
permit two minority group members to serve along
with twenty-one members of the displaced juror's
own race would be unlikely to conclude that his
race had been branded inferior, that he had been
judged not good enough to serve, or that he had
personally been evaluated on the basis of crude
group stereotypes.67
Affirmative action programs sometimes are
thought to stigmatize, not members of the majority
race, but the programs' intended beneficiaries. These
programs may appear to give special consideration to
people who would not have qualified for a benefit on
the basis of merit alone. Jury selection rests less on
merit than on chance, however, and a racial quota
would merely supplement one mechanism for pro-
moting community representation (random selec-
tion) with another (deliberate racial balance). This
sort of affirmative action would not imply that
unqualified or marginally qualified people had been
given a special boost.
Apart from any injury that affirmative action pro-
grams may inflict on displaced majority-group mem-
bers or the programs' intended beneficiaries, these
programs sometimes appear to divert governmental
or private enterprises from their primary missions
and to injure the public. As the potential patients of
delivered, they ask to be and are excused, lawyers challenge them, or
they are never sent to a courtroom. See id. at 243 n.1.
6 In this respect, the Hennepin County proposal does not differ
from other affirmative action measures. These measures rarely, if ever,
brand or stigmatize whites.
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brain and heart surgeons, for example, we might well
be concerned if we concluded that medical schools
were admitting students who they doubted would be
as successful surgeons as the ones they turned away.
There is, however, no reason whatever to suppose
that grand juries designed to include two minority-
group members would accomplish their purposes less
effectively than grand juries selected entirely at ran-
dom. To the contrary, these grand juries probably
would achieve their goals better. Ensuring the pres-
ence of minority-race jurors seems as likely or more
likely to enhance the quality of grand juries' perfor-
mance than other departures from random selection
that the Supreme Court has upheld-for example,
requirements that jurors be upright, intelligent, and
well regarded in their communities."8
Grand and petit juries should to a considerable
extent reflect the will of the community, and their
judgments should command community respect.' By
marshaling a substantial body of opinion in support
of their rulings, juries help to assure all members of
the community that the awesome power to accuse
and convict people of serious crimes is exercised in a
legitimate way. The principal reasons for impaneling
a reasonably large body of jurors are in fact to ensure
a diversity of viewpoints, to increase the likelihood
that the jury will represent all elements of the com-
munity, to promote group deliberation, and to
enhance the public's acceptance of grand jury rul-
ings. Ensuring some diversity of race and ethnicity is
likely to promote all of these objectives as well.
The proponents of affirmative action in jury
selection sometimes have emphasized the appear-
ance of justice as much as (or more than) the sub-
stance of justice."o The Supreme Court has said that
68E.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 353-55 (1970) (upholding
a Georgia statute giving commissioners discretion to eliminate anyone
found not "upright" and "intelligent"); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396
U.S. 320, 331-37 (1970) (upholding an Alabama requirement that
jurors be "generally reputed to be honest and intelligent ... and ...
esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character and
sound judgment").
"See infra text accompanying notes 119-24; cf. 2 James Wilson,
"The Subject Continued-of Juries," in The Works of James Wilson
503, 537 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967) ("The grand jury are a
great channel of communication, between those who make and
administer the laws, and those for whom the laws are made and
administered.")
70 See, e.g., King, supra note 21, at 762 (declaring "(1) that maxi-
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the "need for public confidence is especially high in
cases involving race-related crimes. In such cases,
emotions in the affected community will inevitably
be heated and volatile. Public confidence in the
integrity of the criminal justice system is essential for
preserving community peace in trials involving race-
related crimes."7'
Jeffrey Abramson has cautioned, however,
against an overemphasis on appearances, cosmetics,
and public relations: "This attempt to justify the
cross-sectional ideal by reference to its contribution
to the appearance rather than the actuality of jus-
tice is disturbing. It makes the purpose of the cross-
sectional theory a nakedly political one, bent on
popularizing the verdict . . . ."7 Even after the dis-
turbances following the Rodney King verdict, it is
more important that justice be done than that it be
seen to be done.7 ' Nevertheless, public confidence
in the legal system remains (other things equal)
preferable to the alternative. That the Hennepin
County proposal might make some members of
minority groups less likely to view American crimi-
nal justice as an alien system is among the propos-
al's virtues. As Andrew Deiss has observed, even
Americans whose own view of the videotape evi-
dence initially persuaded them of the guilt of the
police officers who beat Rodney King probably
would have seen the officers' acquittals as just (or at
least as acceptable) if these verdicts had been ren-
dered by an all-African-American jury. One mea-
sure of a jury system's success may be the extent to
which it inspires the members of a diverse commu-
nity to say of verdicts that depart from their
predilections, "I guess I was wrong.""
Diverse viewpoints are more important to a jury's
mizing the appearance of fairness of criminal jury proceedings is a
compelling governmental interest, (2) that fair racial representation
on juries is vital to the appearance of fairness in criminal jury proceed-
ings, and (3) that in some circumstances race-conscious selection
practices may improve, not impair, this appearance" (footnote omit-
ted)).
niGeorgia v. McCollum. 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992) (footnote
omitted).
7 Abramson, supta note 50, at 125.
7Compare the too grand, too English, and too often quoted state-
ment of Rex v. Sussexjustices, [1924] 1 K.B. 256, 259: "U]ustice should
not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to
be done."
7
4See Deiss, supra note 43, at 51.
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performance than diverse skin color, but promoting
diversity of race and ethnicity may provide a more
workable means of ensuring diverse viewpoints than
attempting to probe viewpoints directly through
questionnaires, voir dire examinations, and the like.
The experiences of members of different racial and
ethnic groups tend to differ in ways that may affect
their perceptions of some issues that come before
juries." Not only would the direct probing of the
attitudes of prospective jurors be burdensome and
invasive of their privacy, but it also would pose a risk
of governmental viewpoint discrimination. This risk
seems insubstantial when jury selection rests on
objective demographic indicators of social experi-
ence and when no group is assured more representa-
tion than its share of the population.
In short, the Hennepin County quotas would pre-
sent few of the difficulties that prompt concern
about other affirmative action programs and about
racial classifications in general. These quotas would
not deprive individuals of significant tangible bene-
fits; they would not brand any group as inferior or
evaluate any individual on the basis of racial stereo-
types; and far from diverting the grand jury from its
central mission, they would be likely to enhance the
grand jury's achievement of its objectives.
VI. Peremptory Challenges and Racial Balance
Ironically, the Supreme Court Justices who appear
most likely to disapprove the Hennepin County pro-
75 See, e.g., Jim Ross, "Race Divides Opinions on Bunch Case, Poll
Says," St. Petersburg Times, Nov. 21, 1993, at Al; "Most Blacks Say
Too Few Convicted in King Beating Case," Reuters, Apr. 19, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuna File (reporting that twice as
high a percentage of African-Americans as of whites consider the jus-
tice system biased). Both of these sources and others suggesting racial
differences are cited in Nancy J. King, "The Effects of Race-Conscious
Jury Selection on Public Confidence in the Fairness of Jury
Proceedings: An Empirical Puzzle," 31'Am. Crim. L Rev. 1177, 1192-
95 (1994).
The Florida Supreme Court recently ordered an evidentiary hear-
ing in a civil case in which one member of an all-white jury reported
that some of his fellow jurors had compared a black witness to a
chimpanzee, used racial epithets, and joked that the plaintiffs' chil-
dren probably were drug dealers. Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., No.
83,625, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 24, at *1-*3 (No. 83,625, Jan. 19, 1995).
Even when the presence of one or more minority-race jurors does not
affect the quality of a jury's deliberations, it is likely to inhibit this
sort of dialogue.
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posal have expressed sympathy for a more invidious
procedure that they believe may contribute in some
circumstances to racially balanced juries. In Georgia
v. McCollum, 6 the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution forbids defense attorneys as well as pros-
ecutors from exercising peremptory challenges to
exclude prospective African-American jurors on the
basis of race." An amicus curiae brief submitted by the
NAACP in support of the McCollum ruling suggested
that the use of peremptory challenges by minority
defendants to exclude prospective white jurors should
be treated differently. The brief declared, "The only
possible chance the defendant may have of having
any minority jurors on the jury that actually tries him
will be if he uses his peremptories to strike members
of the majority race."7 Justice O'Connor, dissenting
in McCollum, quoted this language with approval.7 1
Justice Thomas, concurring in McCollum only on the
ground that precedent compelled the Court's result,
declared, "I am certain that black criminal defen-
dants will rue the day that this court ventured down
th[e] road" of using the Constitution to restrict
peremptory challenges.'
An unrestricted regime of peremptory challenges
of the sort apparently favored by Justice Thomas
and other Supreme Court Justices"1 is far more like-
ly to produce all-white juries and other forms of
racial imbalance than a regime in which discrimi-
nation in the exercise of peremptory challenges is
forbidden. One need not be a great mathematician
to recognize that when both sides have an equal
number of challenges,82 an advocate seeking the
76112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
n Id. at 2359.
Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Inc. at 9-10, McCollum v. Georgia, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (No.
91-372).
7 9 McColum, 112 S. Ct. at 2364 (O'Connnor, J., dissenting).
sId. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., Ill S. Ct. 2077, 2095 (1991) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) ("Both sides have peremptory challenges, and they are some-
times used to assure rather than to prevent a racially diverse jury.").
8'See J.E.B. v. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1436 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 417 (1991) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 137 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
82Only 15 of 51 American jurisdictions afford defendants more
peremptory challenges than prosecutors in noncapital felony cases,
and only seven provide more challenges to defendants in misde-
meanor cases. Jon Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures 282-84 (1977).
19
exclusion of a minority group is more likely to
achieve her objective than an advocate seeking the
exclusion of the majority."
Even the asymmetrical regime of challenges
favored by the NAACP, permitting defendants to
challenge prospective jurors on racial grounds only
when the jurors are white, would produce racial bal-
ance only by happenstance and only on the basis of
a partisan attorney's stereotypical judgment about
the members of a racial group. A defense attorney
representing an African-American defendant who
challenges white jurors on the basis of race has con-
cluded (perhaps accurately) that minority-group
jurors are more likely than whites to favor her
client's position. This advocate does not seek diver-
sity, balance, more effective group deliberation,
greater public confidence in the fairness of the jus-
tice system, or any other public good. Her goal, like
that of every other advocate, is victory for her client.
Although this advocate might be unlikely to secure
the presence of more than two or three minority-
group members on a twelve-person jury, she proba-
bly would if she could. Indeed, if luck permitted her
to eliminate all prospective white jurors, she proba-
bly would consider this racial banishment a victory.m
The Hennepin County plan does not depend on
the uncertain outcome of partisan race wars (or race
games) in the courtroom, and it does not rest on any
judgment about how the members of racial groups
are likely to vote in particular cases." Unlike the
strategies of partisans, this plan is designed to pro-
8
3 See Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 515-16 (Mass.
1979) (noting that unrestricted peremptory challenges produce "a jury
in which the subtle group biases of the majority are permitted to oper-
ate, while those of the minority have been silenced").
8The Supreme Court has rejected the views of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, Scalia, and O'Connor and has forbid-
den both prosecutors and defense attorneys from exercising peremptory
challenges on racial grounds. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348,
2359 (1992); Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. Until courts or legislatures abolish
the peremptory challenge, however, the ban on racial discrimination
will remain reasonably easy to evade. See Alschuler, supra note 62, at
170-79. One virtue of racial quotas is that they reduce the incentive of
lawyers to engage in racial discrimination whenever the elimination of
a minority juror would bring the number of minority jurors below the
required minimum. Discrimination in this situation would merely lead
to the replacement of one minority juror by another.
8 The proposal does rest on the perception that the members of
racial minorities are likely to have distinctive perspectives, and of
course these perspectives may lead minority group members to vote
differently from whites. The proposal does not, however, rest on any
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mote the public objectives of more effective grand
jury deliberation and enhanced public confidence
in grand jury rulings. The Hennepin County pro-
posal rests on only one group judgment-that the
members of racial minorities are likely to have (or
sometimes may have, or may reasonably be seen by
the public as having) distinctive experiences and
perspectives that can improve a grand jury's perfor-
mance. If the Supreme Court Justices who have
defended the racially based exercise of peremptory
challenges by either defense attorneys or prosecu-
tors were to condemn the Hennepin County pro-
posal as discriminatory, they surely would have
things topsy-turvy. Peremptory challenges can con-
vey to excluded jurors the messages that Hennepin
County's quotas do not-that someone (a lawyer or
perhaps a judge86 ) disfavors the jurors' racial or eth-
nic groups, that this person has judged the jurors
not capable or trustworthy enough to serve, and
that the jurors have been evaluated on the basis of
crude group stereotypes.
Rulings on the use of peremptory challenges and
other jury qualification issues sometimes give judges
a sub rosa opportunity to engage in color-conscious
jury selection, and their efforts to achieve racial bal-
ance may prove more costly than openly acknowl-
edged forms of affirmative action. In the second trial
of the police officers accused of beating Rodney King
(the federal court trial), Judge John G. Davies
refused to permit the defendants to challenge
peremptorily an African-American who had failed
to disclose that he lived in South Central Los
Angeles, near the center of the rioting that had fol-
lowed the first King verdict. The defendants' lawyers
prediction of the direction or magnitude of racial differences in voting
patterns, let alone on any prediction of racial differences in particular
cases. The general sense of racial difference that informs the proposal
bears little resemblance to the crude racial judgments that are likely to
inform the exercise of peremptory challenges.
86 Peremptory challenges often are not exercised openly in the
courtroom. After opposing lawyers have told a judge which prospec-
tive juror they wish to strike, the judge simply informs these jurors
that they have been excused. See Cathy E. Bennett & Robert B.
Hirschhorn, Bennett's Guide to Jury Selection and Trial Dynamics §
17.21 (1993); James J. Gobert & Walter E. Jordan, ]ury Selection: The
Law, Art, and Science of Selecting a ]ury 329 (2d ed. 1990). Cf. Georgia
v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2356 (1992) ("Regardless of who pre-
cipitated the jurors' removal, the perception and the reality . . . . will
be that the court has excused jurors based on race . . .
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feared that this prospective juror had omitted the
information deliberately in an effort to make his way
onto the jury and to remedy the perceived injustice
of the first King verdict. Although Judge Davies ruled
that the lawyers lacked a racially neutral reason for
their challenge, he might have had another reason
for retaining the challenged juror. As George
Fletcher noted, "[N]o one-not the defense, not the
prosecution, not the judge-dared to go to trial with-
out fair 'community' representation on the jury.""
A more striking illustration of the dangers of sub
rosa affirmative action came in the case of Timothy
L. Baugh, an African-American charged with four-
teen rapes in Hennepin County. After one of the
two African-Americans on the panel of prospective
jurors revealed that she knew three of the defen-
dant's prospective alibi witnesses, Judge Robert Lynn
permitted prosecutors to challenge this juror
peremptorily."
The one African-American still on the panel
sometimes answered questions in ways that were dif-
ficult to follow. When, for example, this juror was
asked why he had checked both yes and no to the
question, "Under our system of justice a defendant is
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Do you agree with that principle?," he replied
87George P. Fletcher, With justice For Some: Victims' Rights in
Criminal Trials 54-55 (1995).. Even in a federal district with a large
minority population, colorblind jury selection might have yielded an
all-white jury; the jury that Judge Davies impaneled included only two
African-Americans and one Latino. See supra note 16. One wonders
how many Americans who profess support for a color-blind
Constitution would have been unperturbed by the selection of an all-
white jury in the second King trial.
Prosecutors in the case of 0. J. Simpson could have set the case
for trial in the area of Los Angeles County where the murders of
Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman occurred, but these prose-
cutors evidently preferred a trial in downtown Los Angeles, where the
likelihood that the jury would include African-Americans was greater.
Randall Sullivan, "Unreasonable Doubt" (pt. 2), Rolling Stone, Dec.
29, 1994, at 130, 149. Public opinion polls indicated that African-
Americans were much less likely than whites to favor the prosecutors'
position, id. at 144, but apparently no one (not the elected Los
Angeles County District Attorney, in any event) wished to run the
risk of an overwhelmingly white jury in a racially sensitive case. On
July 19, 1994, the Los Angeles County District Attorney met with 15
African-American leaders who expressed concern that Simpson would
not receive a fair trial and who urged the district attorney not to seek
the death penalty. Id. at 143.
88State v. Baugh, SIP No. 93027320, CA No. 93-1304, Partial
Transcript (Motions) at 26-27 (Hennepin County, Minn., Dist. Ct.
Sept. 28, 1994).
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in part, "You can't really go on facts that much
because that's one of the reasons I got stabbed
because she was being--okay, that facts was I done it,
but I didn't do nothing and come to find out I didn't
do nothing. The facts not always right.""Asked once
more to explain, the juror said, "Let's see, okay, like I
did a couple crimes, but then, okay, I did some of
them and-I did most of them, I did do some of them
and I didn't do some and half of the times, you know,
the facts are there, but it's not there."9"
Other statements were more clear, however. For
example, when the juror was asked, "What do you
think of the criminal justice system?," he replied, "It
sucks."9 ' And when a prosecutor asked how severely
one of the juror's friends had been injured during an
assault, he said,
A Not too bad, she just, you know, just basi-
cally sex though.
Q It was sex?
A Yeah.
Q So this was kind of a rape situation sort of?
A Yeah.92
Judge Lynn refused to dismiss the prospective
juror for cause and also refused to allow a perempto-
ry challenge by the prosecutor. Perhaps the judge
doubted that Minneapolis prosecutors would have
challenged a white juror who voiced the same views
of rape and of the criminal justice system as this
African-American juror. More probably, however,
the judge accepted an extralegal argument against
exclusion advanced by the defense attorney.
Although the Constitution prohibited this lawyer
from taking race into account in exercising his own
peremptory challenges,93 he apparently saw no need
to preserve the pretense of color-blindness while
89State v. Baugh, SIP No. 93027320, CA No. 93-1304, Partial
Transcript (Juror Greg Davis) at 7 (Hennepin County, Minn., Dist.
Ct. Sept. 28, 1994).
9Id. at 41.
" Id. at 34.
92 Id. at 60.
93 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), may not have
condemned unambiguously the racially based challenge of white
prospective jurors, but the Supreme Court's subsequent ruling that the
gender-based challenge of either a woman or a man is unconstitution-
al leaves little room for distinguishing one racially grounded challenge
from another. SeeJ.E.B. v. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419,1422 (1994).
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arguing about his opponent's challenges: "This is our
last chance. We don't have any more opportunities
to have a black person on this jury . . . . I ask this
Court to let this juror stand." 4
Following selection of the challenged juror, a
Minneapolis television station broadcast his mug
shot. (Seven months earlier, the juror had been
arrested for aggravated robbery. He had, however,
been released without the filing of a formal charge.)
The juror then told the court, "I cannot go on the
jury."" Six other jurors reported that they had
learned about the broadcast, all of them by disre-
garding the judge's instructions not to watch televi-
sion..Judge Lynn then dismissed the jury and began
jury selection anew."
A racial quota would have permitted Judge Lynn
to evaluate the prosecutor's challenge on its merits
without concern that permitting the challenge
would have yielded an all-white jury. Such a quota
could have assured the judge that dismissal of the
challenged juror would have led only to the replace-
ment of this minority juror with another.
VII. Some Questions and Problems
A. Racial Matching
Shari Lynn Johnson has proposed that every
African-American, Native American, or Hispanic-
American defendant be entitled to the inclusion of
three "racially similar" jurors on a jury of twelve."
The Hennepin County proposal, however, does not
attempt to match the races of jurors and defendants,
and contrary to common assumptions, its principal
94 State v. Baugh, SIP No. 93027320, CA No. 93-1304, Partial
Transcript (Juror Greg Davis) at 69 (Hennepin County, Minn., Dist.
Ct. Sept. 28, 1994).
9 5 Mike Sweeney, "Pretrial Publicity Spurs Dismissal of Baugh
Juror," St. Paul Pioneer Press; Oct. 4, 1994, at IA. Among the many
people who had approached the juror following the news broadcast
was a stranger who said, "I know you're going to hang him, right?" Id.
9 6 See Doug Grow, "Judge's Reasoning in Baugh Case Isn't New:
Blame Media," Minneapolis Star Trib., Oct. 4, 1994, at B3; Sweeney,
supra note 95, at IA; Margaret Zack, "Judge Dismisses Whole Jury for
Rape Trial," Minneapolis Star Trib., Oct. 4, 1994 at Al.
9Shari L. Johnson, "Black Innocence and the White Jury," 83
Mich. L. Rev. 1611, 1698-99 (1985). Compare Colbert, supra note 51,
at 124 ("IA] race neutral verdict is achieved when at least three black
jurors are selected to judge a criminal or civil case that involves the
rights of a black person.").
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objective is not to assure every minority defendant a
jury of his "peers."9
The presence of minority-race jurors may be espe-
cially important when minority-race defendants are
on trial, but the value of inclusive jury selection pro-
cedures is not limited to the cases of these defen-
dants. The discussion of verdicts by all-white juries
with which this Article began mentioned only one
prosecution in which the defendants were members
of a racial minority, that of the Scottsboro boys.
Most of these troublesome verdicts came in cases in
which the defendants were white. In recent years,
cases in which white law enforcement officers have
been accused of mistreating minority suspects have
been a special source of concern. White jurors may
tend to view the victimization of nonwhites as less
serious than the victimization of members of their
own racial group. This danger seems fully as strong
as the danger that white jurors will be biased against
minority defendants.9 9 Indeed, verdicts by all-white
juries sometimes have been problematic even when
both the defendant and his asserted victim were
white; consider cases in which white jurors tolerated
violence against white Republicans following the
Civil War and against white civil rights workers a
century later.
Moreover, the inclusion of minority jurors can
make juries fairer and more effective in cases that do
98See infra note 132.
9 See David C. Baldus et at., Equal Justice and the Death Penalty: A
Legal and Empirical Analysis 185 (1990) (revealing that the killers of
white victims are more likely to be sentenced to death than the killers
of nonwhite victims and that the race of the victim affects the likeli-
hood of capital punishment more than the race of the defendant);
William C. Heffernan, "The Majoritarian Threat Posed by the Jury,"
25 Crim. L. Bull. 79, 80-82 (1989) (emphasizing that the tyranny of
the majority can infect jury trials just as it does other democratic insti-
tutions and that the risk of this tyranny is as great for unpopular vic-
tims and those who identify with them as it is for criminal defen-
dants).
Jeffrey Abramson has summarized some findings of the University
of Chicago jury Project of the 1950s:
In regard to black defendants, the study suggested two conclu-
sions about jury verdicts. First, all-white juries had trouble tak-
ing seriously violence within the black community, especially
within the black family. They treated black defendants in such
cases as parents treat children, dismissing their crimes as "what
one expects from a Negro." Second, all-white juries reacted
with severity to black defendants charged with violence against
whites, convicting them in disproportionate numbers.
Abramson, supra note 50, at 110 (discussing Dale W. Broeder, "The
Negro in Court," 1965 Duke L. ]. 19) (footnotes omitted).
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not present racially sensitive issues. Justice Marshall
wrote for the Supreme Court in Peters v. Kiff:
[W]e are unwilling to make the assumption that
the exclusion of Negroes has relevance only for
issues involving race. When any large and identi-
fiable segment of the community is excluded from
jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury
room qualities of human nature and varieties of
human experience, the range of which is
unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not nec-
essary to assume that the excluded group will
consistently vote as a class in order to conclude,
as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a
perspective on human events that may have
unsuspected importance in any case . . .
Affirmative action in jury selection has value in
cases other than those with minority defendants.
Moreover, efforts to match jurors and defendants by
race and ethnicity could prove difficult and unbecom-
ing. These efforts would require courts to confront
such questions as whether Mexican-Americans are
sufficiently similar in background and culture to
Puerto Ricans to merit affirmative inclusion on the
juries of Puerto Rican defendants, whether Filipino-
Americans are sufficiently similar in race and ethnici-
ty to warrant their affirmative inclusion on the juries
of Japanese-American defendants, and whether any
prospective jurors are racially or ethnically similar to a
defendant whose grandparents are African-American,
Hispanic-American, Asian-American, and Native
American."o' As the United States grows more mul-
tiracial and multicultural, 02 troublesome issues of
racial matching could arise more frequently.
r04 0 7 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972); cf. Ballard v. United States, 329
U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946) ("The truth is that [men and women] are not
fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different from a
community composed of both .... [A] flavor, a distinct quality is lost
if either sex is excluded.").
1iSee Alschuler, supra note 62, at 191-92.
102The number of children living in families in which one parent is
white and the other is African-American, Asian-American, or Native
American has tripled since 1970. See Deborah A. Ramirez,
"Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White
Anymore," 47 Stan. L. Rev. 957 (1995) (citing Bureau of the Census,
1990 Data on Interracial Households (1994)); see also Julie C.
Lythcott-Haims, Note, "Where Do Mixed Babies Belong? Racial
Classification in Amerca and Its Implications for Transracial
Adoption," 29 Harv. C.R.-CL. L. Rev. 531 (1994).
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B. Racial Grouping
Affirmative action in jury selection does not
require the racial matching of jurors and defendants.
It does, however, require specification of the appro-
priate group for distinctive treatment. In seeking an
end to all-white grand juries, the Hennepin County
proposal treats "minority persons" as the relevant
group. 3 This choice might appear problematic in
some situations-for example, one in which two
Asian-Americans but no African-Americans have
been selected to serve on a grand jury considering the
alleged abuse of African-Americans by the police.
Few members of racial and ethnic minorities con-
sider themselves part of an undifferentiated "minori-
ty group."' The first Rodney King jury included two
"minority persons" (a Latino and an Asian-
American),' 5 but the inclusion of these jurors did
not forestall the rioting, anger, and recrimination
that followed the jury's verdict. Indeed, the inclu-
sion of these minority jurors did not prevent some
journalists from describing the jury as all-white. '
The appropriateness of grouping minority persons
together may depend partly on the extent to which
the members of racial and ethnic minorities sense
commonalities with one another and on the extent
to which other audiences perceive these commonali-
ties as well. Appropriate grouping may depend more
fundamentally, however, on the demographics of
particular jurisdictions.
Suppose, for example, that the expected number
of African-Americans on a randomly selected jury in
Lake Wobegon County, rounded to the nearest
whole number, is none. Suppose that the expected
0 3 Hennepin County Final Report, supra note 19, at 27.
'4See Johnson, supra note 97, at 1698 (citing empirical data
"which show[ I that minority group members replicate the majority's
view of all racial minorities except their own").
0 5 See Jacqueline Soteropoulos, "With Juries, Appearances Matter;
Experts Say Minority Representation Low," Tampa Trib., Dec. 5,
1994, Florida Metro Section, at 1.
iO6See, e.g., "All-White Jury to Hear Trial of Police in Beating
Case," Orlando Sentinal Trib., Mar. 3, 1992, at A15; Herb Caen,
"Monday Short Line," S.F. Chron., May 4, 1992, at Bl; Lou Cannon,
"L.A. Police Dept.: 'Dragnet' It isn't," Wash. Post, Mar. 29, 1992, at
A3; Jorge Casuso, "Video of L.A. Beating Shown As Trial Begins,"
Chi. Trib., Mar. 6, 1992, at A4; Michael Prowse, "Wounds Run Deep:
America's Racial Tensions Are at Snapping Point," Fin. Times, May
2, 1992, at 9.
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number of Hispanic-Americans also is none, that
the expected number of Native Americans is none,
and that the expected number of Asian-Americans
is none. Suppose, however, that if the members of
these four racial and ethnic groups were joined
together, the expected number of "minority persons"
on each jury would be one or, with only slight
upward rounding, two. Providing for the inclusion of
one or two "minority persons" on every jury in Lake
Wobegon County would ensure some minority rep-
resentation in every case while, in effect, using ran-
dom methods to determine which groups would be
represented in particular cases. Specification of the
appropriate group for distinctive treatment may vary
with the racial and ethnic characteristics and the
social experiences of particular jurisdictions, and
officials who understand local conditions seem best
suited to draw the necessary lines.
C. Nonracial Groups
In 1979, Douglas R. Schmidt, an attorney for Dan
White, succeeded in keeping homosexual men and
women off the jury that tried White for murdering
George Moscone, the mayor of San Francisco, and
Harvey Milk, a San Francisco supervisor and promi-
nent gay activist.' The jury accepted White's par-
tial defense of diminished capacity (often called "the
Twinkie defense" because a defense expert testified
that junk food was one of the influences that had
deprived White of the capacity to act with malice).
The Dan White verdict brought to the streets 5,000
gay men who marched on city hall, smashed win-
dows, and overturned and burned eight police cars.'
In 1991, William Kunstler sought a "third world
jury of nonwhites, or anyone who's been pushed
down by white society,""' to try EI-Sayyid Nosair for
killing Meir Kahane, the founder of the Jewish
Defense League and an Israeli ultranationalist. The
jury that acquitted Nosair of killing Kahane includ-
ed no Jews,"' and the judge who presided at the trial
to7See Fletcher, supra note 87, at 34 ["Since the candidates for the
jury had to declare their marital status, it was not too difficult to ferret
out robable gays....").
Id. at 1, 15, 260.
'
09Abramson, supra note 50, at 145.
"oSee Fletcher, supra note 87, at 75-79.
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declared that its verdict was "against the over-
whelming evidence and . .. devoid of common sense
and logic."'" Jews in both New York and Israel took
to the streets to protest this verdict."2
One year later (during the same year as the first
Rodney King verdict), a Brooklyn jury with no
Jewish members"' acquitted Lemrick Nelson, Jr. of
killing Yankel Rosenbaum during a violent
encounter between African-Americans and Jews."'
Rosenbaum had identified Nelson, an African-
American teenager, as his attacker, and the murder
weapon had been found in Nelson's possession.
Thousands of Hasidic Jews gathered in protest."
As these cases reveal, the members of nonracial
groups may feel aggrieved when no members of their
groups sit on the juries that resolve cases drawing
their strong interest and concern. Nevertheless, in a
reasonably small body like a jury, ensuring propor-
tional representation by race, gender, sexual orienta-
tion, handicap, religion, nationality, wealth, and age
would be impossible. The Hennepin County
Attorney, Michael 0. Freeman (who appointed the
Hennepin County Task Force and who strongly sup-
ports its proposals), reports that he personally would
draw the line at race and accept any political conse-
quences that follow.
This line seems appropriate. No other group in
America can recite a history of mistreatment by
juries comparable to the mistreatment of African-
Americans that the opening section of this Article
chronicled in part. One hundred fifteen years ago, in
Strauder v. West Virginia,"6 the Supreme Court rec-
ognized the distinctiveness of this mistreatment.
Noting the prejudice with which whites regarded
African-Americans,"' the Court held that the exclu-
sion of African-Americans from jury service violated
the right of African-American litigants to equal pro-
tection of the laws. At the same time, the Supreme
Court declared that the exclusion of members of
.. Id. at 85.
1
2 Id.
"
3 Jews constitute 16% of the Brooklyn population and about 20%
of the population eligible for jury service. Id. at 92.
"
4 d. at 103.
"
5 See Abramson, supra note 50, at 103; Fletcher, supra note 87, at
90,103.
"'100 U.S. 303 (1880).
"
7 d. at 309-10.
29
nonracial-groups from jury service (women, for
example) did not violate the equal protection rights
of litigants who belonged to these groups."' The
Court considered racial discrimination sui generis.
In places other than Hennepin County, different
histories, different demographics, and different social
issues might prompt the affirmative inclusion of
members of some nonracial groups on juries. Once
more, the difficult task of grouping and line-drawing
seems best left to state and local governments.
D. Representation or Diversity
The Hennepin County proposal might enhance
the sense of minority-group members and others that
minorities are represented in jury proceedings. It also
might promote the expression of diverse viewpoints
in the jury room and enhance the quality of jury
deliberations. Although the proposal furthers both
objectives and forces no choice between them, the
two goals are not identical."9
The claim that jurors serve in a representative
capacity seems in one sense uncontroversial. When
community moral judgments are too varied and
complex to be translated into precise rules, legisla-
tures may delegate to juries the task of ensuring that
criminal judgments accord with the community's
sense of justice. The Supreme Court has said for
more than fifty years, "[T]he proper functioning of
the jury system, and, indeed, our democracy itself,
"'1d. at 310 ("[A state] may confine the selection to males, to free-
holders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to persons hav-
ing educational qualifications. We do not believe the Fourteenth
Amendment was ever intended to prohibit this."); see Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (holding unanimously that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not extend the vote to women).
"
9 A third objective of the Hennepin County proposal might be
more fully assuring minority defendants that they will be tried by
"juries of their peers" through the inclusion of racially and ethnically
similar jurors. This objective might conflict with either of the others,
but promoting greater identity between defendants and jurors at the
cost of representation of the community is not likely. Few, for exam-
ple, would deliberately include either a disproportionate share of high
school dropouts on the juries that try high school dropouts or a dispro-
portionate share of Ph.D.'s on the juries that try Ph.D.'s. When the
goal of including jurors whom defendants are likely to recognize as
their peers conflicts with the goal of representing the community,
community representation is likely to prevail. Again, however, the
Hennepin County proposal does not carry any of the possible justifica-
tions for affirmative action in jury selection to the point that it con-
flicts with any of the others.
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requires that the jury be a 'body truly representative
of the community.' "20 The Court's most recent
opinion on jury selection reiterated this theme: "The
diverse and representative character of the jury must
be maintained . . . ." Although American juries
now lack the formal power to resolve questions of
law that many American juries once possessed, 2 2
vague standards of substantive criminal law (for
example, in cases presenting questions of homicide,
fraud, obscenity, causation, self-defense, and necessi-
ty) invite and require the exercise of a de facto law-
making power. The exercise of this power seems
appropriate only if juries in some sense represent
their communities. Moreover, juries authorized to
determine the length of prison sentences (in a few
states) and to decide whether to impose the death
penalty (in many) plainly have been afforded their
awesome powers on the assumption that they repre-
sent their communities.
In another sense, however, the claim that jurors
serve in a representative capacity seems trouble-
some: no individual juror should be expected to rep-
resent anyone other than herself. If Hennepin
County's jury selection methods encouraged minori-
ty-race jurors to view themselves not simply as inde-
pendent citizens but as representatives of a race or a
people, that effect would be regrettable.' The
120Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (quoting Smith
v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)); see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S.
223, 237 (1978); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970).
1 2
1).E.B. v. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1424 (1994). But see Holland v.
Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990) (declaring that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees an impartial jury, not a representative one).
122See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, "A Brief History
of the Criminal Jury in the United States," 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867,
902-21 (1994).
123Jeffrey Abramson, an opponent of the use of racial quotas in
jury selection, has written that the issue turns primarily on whether
one views juries as "deliberative" or "representative." See Abramson,
supra note 50, at 8. Abramson has said, "The ideal of the cross-sec-
tional jury rejects thle] common-law view of impartial deliberation. It
sees individual jurors as inevitably the bearers of the diverse perspec-
tives and interests of their race, religion, gender, and ethnic back-
ground." Id. at 100-01. In Abramson's view, "The new purpose of the
cross-section becomes to give voice or representation to competing
group loyalties, almost as if a juror had been sent by constituents to
vote their preferred verdict." Id. at 102. He observes, "Surely the jury
has not survived all these centuries only to reach us that democracy is
about brokering justice among irreconcilably antagonistic groups." Id.
at 8; see also id. at 245-47.
The vision that informs the Hennepin County proposal, however,
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proposition that jurors both represent others and act
independently may seem contradictory, but perhaps
the contradiction can be resolved if juries but not
jurors act as community representatives. The selec-
tion of a sufficiently large body of jurors through suf-
ficiently inclusive means may permit every juror to
vote her conscience while still providing some assur-
ance that the jury's collective judgment accords with
general community sentiments."' The Hennepin
County proposal reflects the same ambivalence con-
cerning representation that characterizes most views
of the jury; it is not intended to compromise or
restrict the independence of jurors.
Adding diverse perspectives to the jury room
could in some circumstances conflict with the goal
of promoting effective representation of the commu-
nity. If, for example, a rural county with a tiny
minority population were to include one or two
minority-group members on every jury (perhaps
even importing some of these jurors from an urban
neighborhood outside the county), this measure
is not one of selfish interest-group politics. Such a vision, extended to
the jury room, might yield only hung juries and compromise verdicts.
Instead, the vision of politics that the Hennepin County Task Force
hoped to implement more fully in the jury room is one that has been
described by Robert Hughes:
The social richness of America, so striking to the foreigner,
comes from the diversity of its tribes. Its capacity for cohesion,
for some spirit of common agreement on what is to be done,
comes from the willingness of those tribes not to elevate their
cultural differences into impassable barriers and ramparts, not to
fetishize their "African-ness" or Italianita, which make them dis-
tinct, at the expense of their Americanness, which gives them a
vast common ground.
Robert Hughes, Culture of the Complaint: The Fraying of America 20
(1993). As Abramson notes, "[]urors cross demographic boundaries to
reach unanimous verdicts in cases every day." Abramson, supra note
50, at 104. Abramson's two models of the jury do not seem incompati-
ble; juries can be both deliberative and representative. Indeed, the
principal reason for making juries more representative is to improve
the uality of their deliberations.
4James Madison suggested that elected officials should seek to
advance the welfare of the community rather than to promote the
views of their own constituents. See The Federalist No. 10, at 60-61
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). This position echoed that of Edmund
Burke, who maintained that legislators should regard themselves as
trustees rather than as delegates-that is, as people trusted by the elec-
torate to exercise independent judgment rather than as people chosen
to implement the electorate's own legislative goals. See Edmund
Burke, Burke's Politics 28 (Ross Hoffman & Paul Levack eds., 1949);
Hannah Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 171-72 (1967). Jurors
certainly should sense no greater obligation to act as representatives
than legislators and other elected officials do. They probably should
sense subsbantially less.
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might enhance the expression of distinctive view-
points while making juries less representative of the
county's population.'25
The extent to which governments can legitimate-
ly sacrifice representation to enhance the quality of
jury deliberations is unclear.'26 For example, in an
effort to improve the performance of juries, a state
might mandate the affirmative inclusion of some
jurors on nonracial bases. This state might require
that every jury include one college graduate, that
every jury impaneled to hear a tax prosecution
include two accountants, that half of the jurors hear-
ing a medical malpractice case be members of the
medical profession, that a jury hearing a mercantile
dispute be composed mostly of merchants, and that
every jury include a licensed member of the bar.
Some of this state's mandatory inclusions might be
constitutional, while others might seem inconsistent
with a concept of jury trial that state and federal
constitutions should preserve.'27
One danger posed by the nonrandom inclusion
on juries of people with special qualifications is that
of ideological jury-stacking. This danger seems most
pronounced when the likelihood of distinctive view-
points is itself considered a qualification for service
and when officials may guarantee some favored
groups greater-than-proportional representation.
The Constitution probably should limit the govern-
ment's ability to place its thumb on the scales in the
marketplace of ideas established in most jury deliber-
125The likelihood that any political agency would in fact vote to
make juries less representative in order to enhance diversity seems
exceedingly small.
126Compare cases cited supra note 68 with Thiel v. Southern Pac.
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223-25 (1946) (using the Supreme Court's super-
visory power to strike down an exclusion of daily wage earners from
jury service and declaring that the Court would not "breathe life into
any latent tendencies to establish the jury as the instrument of the
economically and socially privileged").
127Common law courts sometimes impaneled juries of experts,
which "ranged from panels of cooks and fishmongers to the all-female
jury to ascertain whether a female defendant was pregnant." Oldham,
supra note 48, at 139; See also I James Oldham, The Mansfield
Manuscripts and the Growth of English Law in the Eighteenth Century 93-
99 (1992) (describing Lord Chief Justice Mansfield's use of merchant
juries in commercial cases). Even apart from the use of "special" juries,
property qualifications and other devices were intended to make com-
mon law juries more "qualified" than "representative." See Oldham,
supra note 48, at 140-64. But see Thiel, 328 U.S. at 223-24 (declaring
that the democratic nature of jury system makes wealth irrelevant to
qualification for jury service).
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ations"' Even if diversity rather than representation
is the principal objective of the Hennepin County
proposal, proportionality may remain an essential
constraint.
The principal purpose of the Hennepin County
proposal is not to enhance any group's aggregate vot-
ing power. It is to guarantee that minority voices
will be heard in every case rather than loudly in one,
softly in another, and not at all in a third depending
on the luck of a random draw. Nevertheless, the
appropriate baseline for judging proportional repre-
sentation is probably the percentage of minority-
group members in the adult population rather than
the proportion of minority-group members who have
served on a county's juries in the past.129 Within the
limits of proportionality set by this baseline, the
Hennepin County proposal could increase the num-
ber of minorities on grand juries. Hennepin County
has, however, bounded diversity with a fair and sen-
sible principle of proportionality.
VIII. The Downside
The preceding Part considered some possibly
troublesome aspects of Hennepin County's proposed
methods of jury selection The principal objection to
these color-conscious methods, however, is simply
that they are color-conscious. A program grounded
on the perception. that the members of different
races have different viewpoints may make it more
likely that racially distinctive viewpoints will persist.
This program may encourage people to view them-
selves and others in racial terms.' 30
128But see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178 (1986) (declar-
ing that "an impartial jury consists of nothing more than 'jurors who
will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts,' " so that the
exclusion of all Republicans might be permissible if the Democrats
and Libertarians who remained on a jury were fair-minded people who
would conscientiously apply the law to the facts).
129 In voting rights cases the Supreme Court generally has referred
to adult population figures in assessing whether minorities have been
over- or underrepresented. See, e.g., Thonburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30, 38-39 (1986). In Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2662
n.18 (1994), the Court declined to decide whether the appropriate
baseline for judging the representation of Latinos in Florida was the
percentage of Latinos in the state's entire population, in the state's
population of adult residents, or in the state's population of adult citi-
zens. The Court did not mention the percentage of Latinos in the
state's population of registered (or actual) voters as a possible baseline.
130justice O'Connor wrote for the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno,
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For the most part, the Hennepin County proposal
competes, not with tangible opposing interests, but
with an ideal of colorblindness."' And the Supreme
Court's decisions on the importance of color-blind-
ness have vacillated."2 In cases named Bakke,"'
Stotts,' 4 Wygant, 5 Croson,"6 Shaw v. Reno,"' and
Adarand," the Court has struck down color-con-
scious affirmative action measures under either the
Equal Protection Clause or Title VII. In cases named
Green,'39 Swann,1 40 Barresi,' Carey, 42  Weber, 4 1
Fullilove,"' Sheet Metal Workers,'4 1 International Ass'n
of Firefighters,146 Paradise 1, and Metro Broadcasting,4 1
the Court has upheld color-conscious affirmative
action measures or has itself mandated color-con-
scious remedies for past discrimination.
As the judiciary has found itself unable to provide
leadership on the issue, the two other branches of
government generally have concluded that race can-
not be disregarded. President Clinton campaigned
113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993):
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to
our society . . . . Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial pur-
poses, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threat.
ens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in
which race no longer matters-a goal that the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation con-
tinues to aspire.
131 Without endorsing an ideal of color-blindness, however, one
might object to racial quotas simply on the ground that they make
race-one characteristic among many-too important. Deborah
Ramirez has made this point eloquently: "I am Latino. But I am also a
mother, lawyer, teacher, wife. I don't like being reduced to one aspect
of myself." Letter to author from Deborah A. Ramirez (Aug. 19, 1994)
(on file with author).
"'See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 ("This Court never has held that
race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible in all circum-
stances.").
3 3 Regents of the Univ. ofCalifornia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).3 4 Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
3 5 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 478 U.S. 1014 (1986).
136City of Richmond v.].A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
13113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
38Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
139Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
140Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
'
4 1McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971).
1
4
zUnited]ewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
1
4 3 United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
1 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
L45 ocal 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421 (1986).
'
46Local 93, Int'l Au'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S.
501 (1986).
4 United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
1
4 8 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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for office on a promise to make his cabinet and the
rest of his administration look like America."' His
predecessor in the White House, a member of a dif-
ferent political party, made obvious efforts to ensure
continued African-American representation on the
Supreme Court.' Congress has repeatedly approved
minority set-asides and preferences, measures that
seem more likely to be the result of troublesome
rent-seeking behavior than jury-selection quotas,
which do not distribute the government's wealth."'
Presidents and other elected officials are not
color-blind, and in that respect they are not very dif-
ferent from the rest of us.'52 One wonders how many
American universities, colleges, high schools,
research institutes, television talk shows,
Y.M.C.A.'s, Rotary Clubs, and church groups con-
duct forums on racially sensitive issues (for example,
the use of color-conscious methods in jury selection)
without deliberately including one or more minori-
ty-group speakers on their programs. Why do these
groups act to ensure racial and ethnic diversity
among their speakers when they do? The planners of
public programs probably do not expect minority-
group participants to speak for racial or ethnic
groups rather than presenting their own carefully
considered positions. Nevertheless, these planners
may sense that the experience of being a member of
a minority group in America is distinctive-a some-
thing and not a nothing. This experience may con-
tribute to what a speaker has to say, and the partici-
pation of people with this experience may help to
keep the rest of us from floating too far out to sea.
What is true of Rotary Club programs in
149See Judy Keen, "Clinton to Be Held to Vow of Diversity," USA
Toda, Nov. 13, 1992, at Al.
15 See Maureen Dowd, "The Supreme Court: Conservative Black
Judge, Clarence Thomas, Is Named to Marshall's Court Seat," N.Y.
Times, July 2, 1991, at Al.
1'
5 See, e.g., Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L No.
95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (codified in significant part at 42 U.S.C. §§
6705(e)-6707(j) (1988)) (upheld in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448 (1980)); Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-31 (1987) (upheld in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)), Act of Nov. 14,
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-151, 97 Stat. 964, 970 (uncodified foreign aid
appropriation); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1988) (authorizing
government contracts with employers who implement affirmative
action programs).
152Note, for example, the sub rosa efforts of trial judges to avoid
all-white juries described supra text accompanying notes 87-96.
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Massachusetts and Montana is equally true of grand
juries in Minnesota, and making Hennepin County
grand juries look like Hennepin County seems legiti-
mate and appropriate.
Americans are not color-blind. They cannot be.
The Constitution does not require them to pretend
to be. The Constitution requires only that the gov-
ernment not stigmatize or otherwise disadvantage
people on the basis of race (at least not without a
sufficiently compelling reason for doing so). The jury
selection methods proposed in Hennepin County do
not stigmatize or disadvantage people on the basis of
race, and I believe that they are constitutional.
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